A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula indiscriminately used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas. The phenomenon of interpreting existing provisions to find new and closely-allied rights is probably best known and illustrated by the Supreme Court of the United States ruling in Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965) where the Court 'interpreted' a Constitutional Right to Privacy out of the US Constitution, even although that instrument makes no specific mention of any such right. The rationale is usually that the express provisions are so intimately linked to the protection of say, privacy or autonomy, that they must be interpreted in a manner that directly protects the latter. We mention this with no disrespect to Munby J. It is simply that the general tenor of Burke v GMC reminds us that medical jurisprudence as a whole is in danger of falling into the trap. What do we mean when we speak of the sanctity of life ?
Are we adopting a vitalist attitude implying that life must be preserved at all costs; do we mean, simply, that life should not be deliberately taken away or are we incorporating an element of quality in our definition of sanctity ? What do we mean by, say, 'dying with dignity'? The phrase is rapidly becoming synonymous with dying undisturbed by invasive apparatus 10 although others might hold that to have experts struggling to revive a patient with the use of advanced technology is, itself, a recognition of that person's dignity. 11 At what point do the interests of the community set a limit to the self-determination of the individual ?
True definitions are hard to come by yet they are essential if a proper balance is to be set between the conflicting ethical imperatives -and achieving that balance lies at the heart of Burke. Indeed, the case is a good illustration of a growing phenomenon in medical law -that is, the attempted marriage of ethical and legal concepts by which to identify the fundamentals of the discipline itself.
Human dignity
Much space was devoted to a consideration of respect for human dignity which, as we have said, is a difficult concept but one which Munby J rates highly 12 as not being 'a meaningless incantation' but a fundamental recognition of our humanity and a recognition, in particular, of a person's interest in the manner of his or her death.
[57] In our view, much of the difficulty would disappear if we reverted to the civil law tradition of equating infringement of dignitas with insult to the personality.
13
It is, thus, not so much the nature of the treatment given which affects the patient's 10 And this seems to be Munby J's general view.
11
Munby J takes this point at [66] -finding 'the right balance between using undignified means in striving to achieve dignified ends '. 12 Quoting his judgment in R (on the application of A, B, X and Y) v East Sussex CC and the Disability Rights Commission (No. 2) [2003] EWHC 167(Admin.) at [86] . 13 For modern discussion, see J Neethling, J M Potgieter and P J Visser Neethling's Law of Personality (1996) , chapter 6. This being the case, it is the concept of dignity which is most likely to impinge on Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights. 7 7 protection of health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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Munby J even talks of the 'absolute nature' of the right to respect for autonomy and self-determination. [75] We suggest, however, that this uncompromising interpretation currently attracts no support in either ethics or law, save in the context of refusal of treatment, which is not at issue in this case. Finally, we wonder about the consequences of this ECHR duet between Articles 3 and 8. Why, for example, is it not sufficient to argue that withdrawal of AHN is prima facie a breach of Article 3, as we would agree? Why also rely on Article 8? One answer might be that, as Munby J acknowledges, the test for severity of treatment under Article 3 has a high threshold; it is, moreover, often tied to intentionally harmful conduct. Article 8, however, ushers in the value and importance of the views of the patient, and this is enough to tip the balance in favour of what the patient wants. The net result is typical of a more general movement in medical law to prioritise autonomy over other considerations. This is something which continues to concern us and which we have lamented elsewhere.
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The most worrying aspect, however, is that Munby J's use of the language of determinism implies that, as a matter of law, what the patient wants is what the patient should get. We explore this further below.
Best interests
Dignity and best interests are entwined and the judgment in Burke contains a lengthy analysis of the latter. Here, we suspect that Munby J's main anxiety is to confine the doctor's role in decision-making and this is understandable insofar as, as we have noted, he was concerned in the main with the competent patient. But, in leading with the, now, well-known statement of Butler Sloss P:
Best interests are not limited to best medical interests, 18 he moved into the field of the incompetent and out of that of autonomous choice.
Moreover, he followed this with an analysis of, and reliance on, two seminal cases 19 Thus, the subjects in these cases were not afflicted with physical disease and, inevitably, their 'interests' were essentially their welfare interests. We take leave to doubt if a case such as Re A, concerning sterilisation of a Down's syndrome boy, is a good precedent for one involving a life and death decision. Even so, the tone of these two judgments can be summed up in the words of Butler Sloss P that 'best interests encompasses medical, emotional and all other welfare issues' and Munby J extrapolated this:
The short point is that doctors can properly claim expertise on medical matters; but they can claim no special expertise on the many non-medical matters which … go to form the basis of any decision as to what is in patient's best interests. [94] He did, however, go what seems to be a considerable distance further: Read baldly, this appears to say that a doctor should seek court approval of every decision he takes in relation to an incompetent patient and this cannot be so.
We are reminded of Lord Brandon's statement of the common law position:
The lawfulness of a doctor … giving treatment to an adult patient disabled from giving consent will depend not on any approval or sanction of a court but on the question whether the … treatment is in the best interests of the patient concerned. That is, from a practical point of view, just as well, for, if every … treatment to be given required the approval or the sanction of the court, the whole process of medical care for such patients would grind to a halt. This undoubtedly stands as a matter of law. But it must now be read in light of Munby J's importation of a test of 'right thinking persons' and how they would consider the best interests of, and the dignified (or otherwise) state of, the incompetent patient.
Sanctity of life
In fact, we find much of this part of the judicial argument confusing as it is, as admitted, 21 related to best interests in general. In respect of ANH in particular, Munby J is clearly suspicious of the several cases he quotes which seek, progressively, to modify the concept of the sanctity of life in favour of one which admits of a value judgment; his starting point, as he says, lies in the very strong presumption in favour of taking all steps which will prolong life -'Save in exceptional circumstances, or where the patient is dying, the best interests of the patient will normally require such steps to be taken'. [100] This is a near vitalist approach which, as a generalisation, is hard to sustain whether one measures 'best interests' in holistic or purely medical terms. Even so, if the doctor's clinical acumen is to be rejected as a measure of 'exceptional circumstances', one must have some bench mark at which the sanctity of life gives way to the principle of best interests -and Munby J seizes upon 'intolerability of life' as his touchstone. It is here that we, with the greatest respect, would wish to take issue with the learned judge.
In the first place, his comparator cases all deal with physical disease for which treatment is available but has failed and in which tolerability is measured by tolerance to pain. The test as it has been applied has been directed to the relief of suffering and involves the cessation of treatment of the underlying condition often also including recourse to the doctrine of double effect -a doctrine which can scarcely apply to fatal neurological disease. Withdrawal of ANH in this latter circumstance is, we suggest, in a different category. The use of the language of futility, however, simply reinforces our central point: whether the life of an insensate patient is couched in terms of 'quality', 'tolerability' or 'futility', the assessment is still a matter of clinical judgment. Insofar as that judgment, in the circumstances, is, essentially, as to when further medical treatment becomes futile, this keynote aspect of the Burke decision seems to us not even to move the goalposts in the decision-making field; at most, it lengthens the pitch.
As for the competent patient, or the incompetent who has expressed him or herself by way of a valid advance directive, it is of crucial importance to note that Munby J lays his cards on the table when it comes to balancing or prioritising ethical and legal principles. He states categorically: 'Important though the sanctity of life is, it has to take second place to personal autonomy; and it may have to take second place to human dignity'.
[80]
Patient autonomy
There is, in fact, surprisingly little to say about the competent patient if the ratio in Burke is concerned only with ANH. In practical terms, it is, as has been mentioned already, almost impossible to conceive of the non-consensual withdrawal of ANH from the sensate subject. The issues then become simply that of patient autonomy -and, even more narrowly, given the ambience, patient autonomy as expressed through an advance directive -and that of the extent to which the exercise of that autonomy should be the determinant of medical treatment. But it is precisely this aspect of the ruling that is worrying because of its unlooked-for, and yet potentially far-reaching, consequences.
The exercise of autonomy in the medical setting is generally interpreted in a negative sense -that is, as expressing the patient's right to refuse treatment. The starting point here is surely, because of its uncompromising tone, Butler Sloss P in Re
MB:
A mentally competent patient has an absolute right to refuse or consent to medical treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all, even where the decision may lead to his or her own death.
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-and there is little doubt as to Munby J's endorsement of the President's views. 24 Whether this principle can maintain its overarching status for all time, is, however, a matter of doubt. The hubris of autonomy is fast becoming conflated with egotistical hedonism and, at some stage, the communitarian ethos must be revisited. The law takes a serious view of death and so does the public -by and large, it is a legal and ethical area where the great majority of persons want certainty. We should think carefully before allowing obeisance to autonomy cloud an area in which crystal clarity is needed.
The meaning of Burke
This ruling leaves us with two fundamental areas of doubt -first, does it require that care be given on demand?, and second, does it require that individual doctors be obligated to provide that care?
The most important feature of the case is that it seems to extend the concept of patient autonomy to a positive right to require treatment -and we will return to this Thus far, there is nothing to suggest that he is being exclusive. When we come to paras 167 et seq, however, he is using almost identical language but in relation to ANH alone -and it is easy, and coherent, to agree with what is said in one context but to reject it in the other. In essence, the latter demands no more than what many would describe as basic care rather than treatment and problems of resource allocation, although not irrelevant, are minimalised. will not do so. We need only consider the position post-Bland. 26 The House of Lords was emphatic that that case provided a precedent only for others concerning patients in persistent vegetative state (PVS), yet a series of subsequent rulings slowly extended it to other medical conditions, and undermined the intended precedent as a result. The costs of providing even basic care, over a sustained period of time, and with attendant staffing costs, must represent a significant impact on the finite resources of a national health service. Thus, even if it is possible to contain this precedent within the parameters of ANH, it can never be divorced from its inherent fiscal consequences.
That these have been ignored arises from the highly individualistic, psuedodeontological approach to patients' rights that has made autonomy a trump card and which ignores the wider impact of the decision. Moreover, we are concerned that this contains elements which suggest entitlement to care in general, implying a right to that care, and not simply a claim to judicial consideration of the arguments. These reached via a dignity-based analysis by arguing, for example, that to remove such basic care as feeding and hydration is -objectively assessed -an affront to human dignity and that a continuing obligation to provide such care is required. But to embrace so completely an individualistic rights-based approach to the question gives a particularly powerful slant to the answer that is given. And, in so doing, it sets a very dangerous precedent.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we find it hard to see just what Burke has achieved in general terms.
The judgment includes an exhaustive and erudite analysis of the law as it stands.
Yet, despite the ultimate findings, it is difficult to see in what respect the GMC's guidelines conflict with the law -such deficiencies as are cited appear to be more those of omission rather than commission. It is even harder to envisage competent medical practitioners undertaking treatment that is so paternalistic as to be contrary to the overall spirit of the opinion in Burke -and Munby J, himself, concedes this at many points. If the precedent is restricted to a ruling on the legality of these guidelines, then one cannot help but regard the judgment as doing much more than tilting at windmills.
The exception to this generality lies in what seems to us to be a fundamental diversion from precedent -that the patient has a right to require treatment. While this may well command majority support in respect of the provision of ANH, we cannot see that it can, in practical terms, be extended to treatments of all types -but this is the inevitable interpretation of Munby J's conclusions at para 213m. In the end, we have to confess to finding this decision unsatisfactory. The failure to distinguish clearly between arguments devoted to the treatment terminal illness in general and provision of ANH in particular serves only to muddy what were, previously, relatively clear waters. It would be disastrous were Burke to precipitate a flood of actions demanding a right to expensive or experimental treatments designed to ward off inevitable death without providing any recognisable benefit.
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Burke could either raise the hopes of many terminally ill patients to improbably high levels or it could achieve little more than a revised wording of professional guidelines which, even as they stand, pose little or no threat to either good medicine or good law.
One wonders, for example, whether cases such as that of child B would be decided differently as a result: R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex p B [1995] 2 All ER 129.
